America and Targeted Killing
The two faces of targeted killing are the United States and Israel. Other countries partake in targeted killing, but it is these countries whose utilization of targeted killing is likely to make the news. The use of targeted killings dates back many decades, but for purposes of our inquiry here, the areas of concern are those targeted following the attacks on September 11. The issue of targeted killing can be traced back to the Church Committee’s criticism of the covert assassination program during the Cold War, which brought President Gerald Ford to promulgate an executive order banning assassinations, a prohibition that was later incorporated into Executive Order 12333 (1981) signed by President Ronald Reagan, which remains in effect today.
The first targeted killing post 9/11 is
believed to be attributed to Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, who was killed in
November 2002, when a Predator Drone fired a missile into a car he was in. Al-Harethi was a suspect in the bombing of the USS Cole, and the attack was
executed with the approval of the Yemeni government, removing some concerns
regarding its legality. The U.S. has since used its targeted killing program in
a number of countries, but the program can be split into two. One targeted
killing program exists in Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which were recognized
as war zones, and thus an “extension of conventional warfare.” It is the second
program, operated by the CIA, which is the object of controversy, and for many
around the world, profound ire.
Under
domestic law, the AUMF allows the President to “use all necessary and
appropriate force” against those who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided”
the 9/11 attacks or “harbored” the attackers. But domestic law, except for the cases of American citizens, is not really an
issue in regards to the CIA program. The issue is with international law. (editor's note: the AUMF is presumably supposed to apply to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and is supposedly in relation to the attacks on 9/11, but it has been decided (unconscionably) that it now applies to ISIS. ISIS had no relationship to 9/11 and specifically broke off from Al-Qaeda.)
A targeted killing conducted
by one state in the territory of a second does not violate the latter's
sovereignty if either the second state consents, or the first, targeting,
state has a right under international law to use force in self-defense under
Article 51 of the UN Charter, because the second state is
responsible for an armed attack against the first state, or the second state is
unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first state launched from
its territory. International law permits the use of lethal force in
self-defense in response to an “armed attack” as long as that force is
necessary and proportionate.
President
Obama laid out the guidelines for the use of targeted killing in 2013. The
requirements include having a legal basis to use force and that the target pose
a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons. Once the decision to strike is
made another set of determinations must be made, which include near certainty
that the terrorist target is present; near certainty that non-combatants will
not be injured or killed; an assessment that capture is not feasible at the
time of the operation; an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities
in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively
address the threat to U.S. persons; and an assessment that no other reasonable
alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons. There is
also a requirement of abiding by international legal principles, including
respect for sovereignty and the law of armed conflict.
The
ACLU has argued that the AUMF only allows strikes in war zones or battlefields,
suggesting that even the border regions with Pakistan would not qualify. Their position is directly contrary to the Obama administration and others, and
the assertion seems misplaced. There is no geographic limitation explicitly stated
in the AUMF. If you were to use the logic employed by the ACLU, the strike on
Osama bin-Laden would exceed President Obama’s authority.
In a
paper, concerning the legality of targeting Anwar Al-Awlawki, Robert Chesney
suggests that treaty language does not impose geographic restrictions and that a
strict, formalistic approach to geographical scope would encourage parties to
spread their forces outside the armed conflict zone, destabilizing peaceful
states. Certainly, this does not mean that the United States can strike in friendly
countries, who exercise control and who are opposed to Al-Qaeda. It is the
countries like Pakistan, whose efforts in stamping out terrorism are suspect,
and in Yemen, where the government is very weak, that targeting could be
permissible.
The
difference between Israel and the United States appears to be the
individualized suspicion and case by case determinations. Additionally, it
appears as though the United States, in its drone war, may not exactly know who
it is targeting, relying on what are termed “signature strikes,” which target
groups of men believed to be associated with terrorist groups, but whose
identities aren’t always known. The other type of strike, known as “personality” strikes, targets known
terrorist leaders.
These
signature strikes cannot withstand scrutiny. If you do not know who the target
actually is, then it is impossible to assess the possible threat that they may
pose. It is difficult to determine how many of these types of strikes have been
perpetrated since 9/11, but the number is likely significant, as the total
number of drone strikes (including personality strikes) numbers in the hundreds,
including 122 in Pakistan alone in 2010.[ix] If
Pakistan is any indication, the numbers do not look good. Only 58 known
militant leaders have been killed in drone strikes in Pakistan, representing
just 2% of total deaths. The lack of statistics presents a difficult challenge, but there are numerous
instances in which large numbers of civilians have been killed.
On
December 17, 2009, according to numerous media reports and Amnesty
International, the United States launched cruise missiles carrying cluster
bombs at a village in southern Yemen called Al-Majalah.[xi]
The strike killed 41 civilians, including 14 women and 21 children. The target
was supposedly an Al-Qaeda training camp, and there were reports that 14
militants were also killed, but the primary target, Qasim al-Raymi, is believed
to have survived.
Four
years later, following Obama’s more stringent regulations for targeting,
hellfire missiles struck a convoy in southern Yemen. The convoy was believed to
have actually been a wedding procession. The missiles killed at least 12 and
wounded at least 15 others.
On
July 6, 2012, in a small village called Zowi Sidgi, in North Waziristan,
Pakistan, a series of drone strikes killed 18 male laborers, including one
child. The first strike struck a tent where men had gathered for an evening
meal. The second strike occurred minutes later after others had come to help
those injured in the first strike.
Because
of the lack of available statistics, it is hard to determine the number of
civilian deaths, as a percentage of total deaths. But, as you might expect, the
United States and Pakistan have different numbers than a number of human rights
organizations. Last year, Pakistan claimed that only 3% of U.S. drone strikes
were noncombatants (67 out of 2,160). However, the UN has claimed the number to be much higher, closer to 18%.
In a
moment of candor last year, Lindsey Graham, asserted that drone strikes had
killed 4,700 people outside the recognized battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan. Graham’s death count would raise questions about the much-vaunted precision of
the strikes. Using the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s count, the U.S. has
launched between 416 and 439 drone strikes in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia since
the U.S. first successfully weaponized an MQ-1 Predator a decade ago. Using the 18% figure determined by the UN, those 4,700 deaths would mean that
nearly 850 civilians have also been killed.
Oddly
enough, there was once a time where targeted killings were abhorrent to United
States policy makers. The American Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, said, in
2001, before the attacks on 9/11 that, “The United States government is very
clearly on record as against targeted assassinations. . . . They are
extrajudicial killings, and we do not support that.” Now, there is no longer any doubt that targeted killing has become official
U.S. policy. Gary Solis, who once ran the law program at the U.S. Military Academy,
commented on the change. “The things we were complaining about from Israel a
few years ago we now embrace,” Solis says. Now, he notes, nobody in the government calls it assassination.
At
first, some intelligence experts were uneasy about drone attacks. In 2002,
Jeffrey Smith, a former C.I.A. general counsel, told Seymour M. Hersh, for an
article in the New Yorker, “If they’re dead, they’re not talking to you, and
you create more martyrs.” And, in an interview with the Washington Post, Smith said that ongoing
drone attacks could “suggest that it’s acceptable behavior to assassinate
people. . . . Assassination as a norm of international conduct exposes American
leaders and Americans overseas.” According to the New America Foundation, Obama authorized as many drone strikes
in his first nine and a half months than President Bush did in his final three
years. By 2012, President Obama had ordered six times as many drone strikes in
Pakistan than President Bush did in his eight years in office.
Are Targeted Assassinations Good for Israel?
In
the 1990s, Israel insisted that it did not engage
in targeted killings. When accused of doing so, the Israel Defense
Forces “wholeheartedly” rejected the accusation, stating that “there has never
been, nor will there ever be an IDF policy of intentional killing of
wanted fugitives ... the sanctity of life is a basic IDF value.”
Israel’s
public acknowledgement of its targeted killing policy in 2000 was, for some, a
revelation. As is often the case within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tendentious
views and interpretations of the policy quickly emerged. For those with only a
facile understanding of the conflict, such a public pronouncement could elicit
reactions that Israel had been surreptitiously hiding the program. The reality
is that the public acknowledgement was merely an affirmation of an already
well-known reality; a paradoxical reality that dates back to Israel’s
independence.
Before
Israel was founded, in 1948, there were three main Zionist military forces
operating in the British Mandate of Palestine. The Haganah, meaning “Defense,”
was the main body, which would later make up a large chunk of the newly formed
Israel Defense Forces. However, there were two other bodies active before
Israel’s founding, the Irgun and Lehi. Both of these organizations were more
militant than the Haganah, and would later form the more conservative blocs of
Israel’s political system. The two groups are notable for a number of deadly
attacks carried out against various targets during Israel’s founding. The King
David Hotel Bombing, which killed nearly 100 people, was orchestrated by the
Irgun. Lord Moyne, a notable British businessman, and Folke Bernadotte, a
Swedish diplomat, were both assassinated by the Lehi. And most notably of all,
the massacre of Deir Yassin, a brutal and abhorrent attack on a Palestinian
village, which left over 100 civilians dead; committed by both the Irgun and
the Lehi. At the time of the Deir Yassin massacre, the Irgun was led by
Menachem Begin, who would later become Prime Minister. Members of both units
would later merge into the Israel Defense Forces.
This
reality of Israel’s nascent years was that there was very little hesitancy in
using violence to achieve strategic objectives, a tactic which would later be
embraced and used by members of Israel’s upper echelon of leaders. It is also
important to put such willingness into context. Israel was emerging out of the
ashes of the Holocaust, and many were determined to undertake any means
necessary to ensure its survival. Fear and apprehension gripped the Jewish
community.
Amos
Oz poignantly and brilliantly discussed this in his prodigious autobiography, A
Tale of Love and Darkness. Oz describes the fear that gripped Jews living in
Palestine in the years before 1948, dealing with threats from Arab leaders like
Azzam Pasha, the former secretary general of the Arab League. Pasha warned Jews
that “if they dared to attempt to create a Zionist entity on a single inch of
Arab land, the Arabs would drown them in their own blood.” Oz characterized Jewish Jerusalem at the time as a “Chekhovian town, confused,
terrified, swept by gossip and false rumor, at its wits’ end, paralyzed by
muddle and terror.” Thus, the need to use force as a necessity is rooted in its
foundation. But the use of violence also coincided with a clear willingness to
seek peaceful solutions. Israel’s reality is that it is a paradox, embodied
within its famous leaders.
Ariel
Sharon was well known for his military prowess and ruthlessness, presiding over
the Qibya Massacre in the West Bank, and bearing indirect responsibility for
the Sabra and Shatila Massacre in Lebanon. Yet, Sharon, who was once closely
aligned with Israel’s right-wing Likud party, also orchestrated Israel’s
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, removing Jewish settlers and handing over the
territory to the Palestinians. Former Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, signed a
peace treaty with Jordan and the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians, a move for
which he was later assassinated, by a Jewish extremist. But Rabin was also the
former Defense Minister, with a distinguished military career, responsible
according to some for the mass expulsion of Palestinians from Lydda and Ramla
during the War of Independence.
The
issue of targeted killings is a microcosm of this paradox. There is a
legitimate and undeniable need for Israel to use force to defend itself. Since
its founding, a myriad of different groups have been trying to destroy it.
First, it was Arab countries in the War of Independence, the Six Day War, and
then during the Yom Kippur War. Then it was various groups, who received
funding and safe-haven from Arab countries. Today, the Sunni Islamist group
Hamas controls the Gaza Strip while its political leader lives in Qatar
(formerly Syria), receiving funding and weapons from Iran. Hezbollah, the
Shiite fundamentalist group, controls large parts of Lebanon, while aiding
Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, and receiving huge support from Iran. Both groups
have made no qualms out of stating their intent to destroy Israel. Is it possible
to placate these groups and their leaders? Is it quixotic to think the
cessation of targeted killing will also bring about an onset of acceptance and
embrace? Are targeted killings myopic; a means of retribution that only
embitters more hostility and hatred towards Israel? The answer, just like every
answer regarding this conflict, is that it’s complicated.
Two
of the most notable targeted killing operations were Operation “Wrath of God”
and Operation “Spring of Youth.” The two operations were separate, but
interrelated, both done in response to the Munich Massacre at the 1972 Olympic
Games, where 11 Israeli athletes and coaches were murdered by Palestinian
terrorists belonging to the organization Black September. Both operations
resulted in the deaths of dozens of Palestinians, some with blood on their
hands, and some not involved in violent activities, as well as the death of
innocent civilians. In 1973, in an operation gone wrong, now known as the
Lillehammer Affair, Mossad agents killed a Moroccan waiter, who they thought
was the noted terrorist, Ali Hassan Salameh. When Salameh was eventually
killed, years later by a 100 pound car bomb, 8 others were killed, including
four civilians. During Operation Spring of Youth, Israeli forces, led by Ehud Barak, who would
later become Prime Minister, stormed a safehouse in Beirut killing three top
PLO leaders. One of those was Kamal Adwan. He was shot 55 times in front of his
family; his 5 year old daughter, Dana, witnessed the killing.
The
reality of those operations was that they were carried out because, according
to Golda Meir, bringing those responsible to trial would be impossible. But was
it effective? Or does it matter? Was this the only means of justice? What are
the long-term ramifications for the family members who witnessed the murder of
their husband or father? At what point does the cycle end? In the movie Munich,
which details the Munich Massacre and the subsequent retaliation, one of the
agents tasked with killing Palestinian suspects wonders what he has
accomplished. He wonders whether those responsible should be brought to justice
in a courtroom rather than with a bullet. Has the killing brought about its
intended objective? “Every man we have killed has been replaced by worst,” he
says, asserting that, “There is no peace at the end of this.”
There are few people in Israel who understand these realties better than the leaders of the Shabak, or Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security organization; Israel’s FBI. Less than 2 years ago, an Israeli filmmaker released a documentary, which chronicled the history of the Shabak, through interviews with six former heads of the organization. A major segment of the documentary involves “targeted assassinations,” illustrating the impossible balancing act imposed on Shabak’s leaders. These difficulties manifested themselves most notably during the Second Intifada.
There are few people in Israel who understand these realties better than the leaders of the Shabak, or Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security organization; Israel’s FBI. Less than 2 years ago, an Israeli filmmaker released a documentary, which chronicled the history of the Shabak, through interviews with six former heads of the organization. A major segment of the documentary involves “targeted assassinations,” illustrating the impossible balancing act imposed on Shabak’s leaders. These difficulties manifested themselves most notably during the Second Intifada.
Yahya
Ayyash was a senior member of Hamas and a bombmaker, known as “The Engineer.”
Ayyash was responsible for bombs that killed dozens of Israelis in the 90s,
actions done in part to derail peace talks between the Palestinian Authority
and Israel. In response, Israel hatched a plan to kill him. The Shabak
authorized an operation, by which a cellphone, loaded with explosives, would
make its way to Ayyash. Ayyash missed his family dearly, and owing to this weak
spot, Israel exploited his desire to talk to his father.[xxviii]
On a Friday morning in January of 1996, Ayyash’s father called his son, and
once the wiretap recognized the voice of Ayyash, the cell phone exploded,
killing Ayyash. There were no other civilian injuries or deaths. For some it was justice. But
the killing had consequences. At the time of the assassination, Israel had been
relatively free of attacks. The response by Palestinian groups was devastating.
On February 25, 1996 a bomb ripped through bus number 18 in Jerusalem, killing
26. On March 3rd, bus number 18 was attacked again, killing 19. The
next day a bomb exploded in central Tel-Aviv, outside Dizengoff Center mall,
killing 13. When asked about the relationship between Ayyash’s assassination and the deaths
of nearly 60 Israelis, former Shabak head Avi Dichter, confirmed there was a
connection. But Dichter points out something very important in the logic of this causal
connection. The alternative doesn’t guarantee non-violence. In other words, according to
Dichter, the idea that not assassinating targets means they won’t try to kill
Israelis is simply a false assertion.
Salah
Shehadeh illustrates another danger of targeted killing. Shehadeh was the
leader of Hamas’s military wing, Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, a man thought to
be personally responsible for the deaths of over one hundred Israelis. According to Avi Dichter, Shehadeh was the man who set Hamas’s terror operation
in motion. The Shabak made plans to take him out. Instead of using a small explosive, like
in the Ayyash killing, the Shabak decided to fire a missile into his home. On
July 22, 2002, they had determined that he was home and that it his daughter
was not, only his wife, and the decision was made to drop a one-ton bomb into a
densely populated neighborhood in Gaza City. The results were devastating. Shehadeh was killed, along with fourteen others,
including nine children. There were calls for the prosecution of Israeli officials responsible for the
bombing, and accusations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. After the
bombing, senior Hamas leader, Abdel Aziz Rantissi (who was later assassinated
in 2004 with hellfire missiles), asserted that “there will be no peace
initiative after today…We will chase them in their houses and in their
apartments, the same way they have destroyed our houses and our apartments.”
These
two separate incidents illustrate the collateral damage associated with
targeted killings. The first is that the actions will embitter deep hatred and
resentment, resulting in calls and acts of revenge, which will result in more
death. The second is the inherent danger of targeting suspected terrorists
within civilian areas; the deaths of innocents. In both, the apparent outcome
is the same: more death. So, how does it end? Ami Ayalon, a former Shabak head,
delves into the difficult and painful issue during the film.
Ayalon
wonders how to tell the difference between those people committing the acts, or
those who help facilitate the acts, and those who simply preach an ideology. It is the ideology, according to Ayalon, that ultimately leads to the death of
Israelis. And if you keep killing each leader whom advocates this ideology, where does it
end? Can it end? Is it immoral? Ayalon suggest that it may be. He asserts that when you don’t deal with the person posing an immediate threat
and rather with the one who is preaching, “We are headed towards a place, which
is forbidden by international law, and basic justice poses huge question marks
as to its ethics.” Ayalon
sees a parallel to Hannah Arendt’s classic phrase, The Banality of Evil. When
you begin killing people en masse, as Israel has done, it becomes, according to
Ayalon, a “conveyor belt,” and “you ask yourself less and less where to stop.”
He
continues, “I can prove to you that Hamas did not become more moderate after
Sheik Yassin was eliminated (Yassin was a spiritual leader of Hamas, confined
to a wheelchair since he was a teen who was killed by an Israel missile while
he was leaving morning prayers in 2004). I can prove to you that when we killed Abbas Musawi (former leader of
Hezbollah) and Nasrallah took over instead, the security situation in Israel
didn’t really improve.” It is this cogent assertion during the film by Ayalon, a man who is as familiar
with Israeli security as any other person on Earth, which gets your attention.
But Ayalon goes a step further regarding the effectiveness of targeted killing.
“I’m talking to you as head of the Shin Bet. It’s ineffective.” But what does a Medal of Valor recipient, former Israeli commando, former
Commander of the Navy, and former Head of Israeli’s Internal Security, really
know about Israel?
